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Abstract 
 
This paper undertakes an analysis of the ‘elusive’ common law defence of necessity and its 
application to detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment. Given 
particular prominence by House of Lords decisions in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, there is a 
somewhat untested assumption that the defence may provide authorisation for detention and 
restraint of people with intellectual impairment under Australian common law (both civil and 
criminal law). This paper explores the defence as it has been traditionally applied, and 
applied to people with intellectual impairment, arguing that as a justification (as utilised by 
the House of Lords) it raises important conceptual and normative questions about the nature 
of law and the legal system. The authors argue that recognition of a justification for the 
detention or restraint of people with intellectual impairment should be resisted by Australian 
courts.  Such an extension of common law principles would result in a lack of procedural 
safeguards for people with intellectual impairment, and potentially undermines the 
consistency of the law with fundamental principles such as liberty and security.  
 
Key words: Necessity; justification; excuse; detention; restraint; intellectual impairment; 
liberty; security 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
People with intellectual impairment (intellectual disability or cognitive impairment)1 have a 
long history of having their rights ignored.2 Their detention in institutional environments, 
where all decisions were made for them by institutional staff, went unquestioned for many 
years. Despite the closure of institutions and the recognition of the importance of community 
living and consent or authority for the medical treatment of people with disability, many 
people with intellectual impairment continue to live in circumstances that involve the use of 
restrictions upon their personal liberties.  
 
For example some people with an intellectual disability live in residential services where the 
doors, windows and gates are locked and their free exit is prevented. Older people with 
dementia sometimes reside in ‘locked wards’ in residential aged care services. People with 
intellectual impairment are also subject to physical and mechanical restraint (that is the use of 
splints, ties and other devices to restrain a person). Detention and restraint are also used as 
part of the medical treatment provided to people with intellectual impairment, including for 
example people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services.  
 
Sometimes (but not always) these practices are used in response to what in the disability 
sector are called ‘challenging behaviours’3 or ‘behaviours of concern.’4  These behaviours 
have been defined as ‘culturally abnormal behaviour(s) of such an intensity, frequency or 
                                            
1 Intellectual impairment is a term used here to include both intellectual disability and cognitive 
impairment. Intellectual disability is defined by the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) as ‘characterised by significant limitation both in intellectual 
functioning and adapative behaviour as expressed in conceptual, social and practical skills, which are 
apparent prior to the age of 18.’ (AAIDD, ‘Definition of Intellectual Disability’ 
<http://wwww.aaidd.org> accessed 17 April 2015) Cognitive impairment refers to a loss of brain 
function that can express itself in a variety of conditions including Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, 
autism, multiple sclerosis and acquired brain injury.  
2 Frances Owen and Dorothy Griffiths (eds), Challenges to the Human Rights of People with 
Intellectual Disabilities (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 2008). See also Office of the Public 
Advocate, ‘People with intellectual disability or cognitive impairment residing long-term in health 
care facilities: Addressing the barriers to deinstitutionalisation’ (October 2013). 
3 Eric Emerson, Challenging Behaviour, Analysis and Intervention in People with Learning 
Difficulties (Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
4 ‘Behaviours of concern’ is an alternative term used to challenge the stereotypes and prejudices about 
people with disability and encourage a more holistic view about environmental and other reasons why 
people with disability may express behaviours that put themselves or others at risk of harm. See 
Jeffrey Chan and others, ‘Is it time to drop the term ‘challenging behaviour?’ (2012) 15 (5) Learning 
Disability Practice 36. 
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duration that the physical safety of the person or others is likely to be placed in serious 
jeopardy; or result in the person being denied access to, ordinary community facilities.’5 In 
response, disability support services have engaged in practices that involve detention, 
seclusion and restraint of people with intellectual impairment and these are often referred to 
as restrictive practices or restrictive interventions. 
 
The legal basis for detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc 
and often unclear.  Unlike the mental health setting where each state and territory has regimes 
that deal with issues such as involuntary detention and treatment,6 there is no comprehensive 
legal framework that authorises and regulates detaining and restraining this cohort of people. 
Yet this conduct gives rise to possible criminal and civil liability if health professionals, 
support workers and others are detaining and/or restraining people without a lawful basis for 
doing so. 
 
Four states – Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory – have passed 
‘restrictive practices legislation’ to expressly authorise and deal with how these practices 
occur for people with intellectual impairment. But these are limited in scope and only apply 
to adults who are receiving government funded disability services.7 These legislative regimes 
do not extend to the use of restrictive practices in other environments such as aged care 
facilities, hospitals and privately funded disability services.  Another possible source of 
legislative power, in the absence of an applicable restrictive practices regime, is adult 
guardianship legislation which facilitates decision-making for adults who lack capacity.8  
Guardianship tribunals do occasionally empower guardians to consent to practices that 
restrict the freedom of movement of the person subject to guardianship or impose other 
‘coercive’ or restrictive practices.9 Yet, without express legislative authority to consent to 
                                            
5 E Emerson, Challenging Behaviour, Analysis and Intervention in People with Learning Difficulties 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
6 Ian Freckelton, ‘Mental Health Law’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott  (eds), 
Health Law in Australia (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2014) 699-741. 
7 See Kim Chandler, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘Rethinking Restrictive Practices: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (2014) 14 (2) QUT Law Review 90 for an examination of the legislative 
frameworks for restrictive practices in Australia. 
8 Nick O’Neil and Carmelle Pesiah, Capacity and the Law (Sydney Law Book Company, Sydney 
2011) [7.5.8] 
9 Nick O’Neil and Carmelle Pesiah, Capacity and the Law (Sydney Law Book Company, Sydney 
2011) [7.5.8]; DLH [2013] NSWGT 4 (17 April 2013); SDF [2013] NSWGT (17 January 2012). 
Indeed, in South Australia, the tribunal is authorised specifically to empower substitute decision-
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detention and restraint, the ability of guardians and attorneys to authorise such practices is 
unclear,10 and tribunals that exercise such powers have noted the need to be careful that 
guardianship orders do not become de facto community protection orders and lose their 
paramount focus on the interests of the individual subject to guardianship.11 Superior courts 
in the exercise of their inherent parens patriae jurisdiction can also and have authorised 
detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment.12 
 
With only a limited group of people with intellectual impairment covered by mental health 
regimes that authorise involuntary detention and treatment, and with limitations of the other 
restrictive practices and guardianship legislative options noted, we turn to the focus of this 
paper: whether the common law defence of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should 
have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities.   Traditionally, 
the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a 
situation of imminent peril, is excused from criminal or civil liability because of the 
extraordinary circumstances he or she finds themselves in. However, the House of Lords in 
In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation)13 and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health 
NHS Trust, ex parte L14 broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for 
treatment, detention and restraint outside the emergency context.  It is the broadening of the 
defence of necessity so as to justify detention and restraint of people with disabilities other 
than in an emergency that we contest. 
 
Before we present our argument as to why the common law should resist such a 
development, it is necessary to touch upon the broad legal framework within which the issue 
of necessity arises in this context in Australia. As will be discussed further below, necessity 
can be relevant to defending a civil claim and also as a criminal law defence. In terms of its 
role in civil proceedings, necessity is recognised as a defence by the common law and so the 
                                                                                                                                        
makers (and others) to detain and/or restrain a person with impaired capacity: Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 32.  
10 In Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, at 435 Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ 
discussed the common law principle that express statutory authorisation, in unmistakable and 
unambiguous language, is required to engage in what would otherwise be tortious conduct.  
11 Nick O’Neil and Carmelle Pesiah, Capacity and the Law (Sydney Law Book Company, Sydney 
2011) [7.5.8]; NSW Guardianship Tribunal, Position Statement: Behaviour Intervention and Support 
in Applications Relating to a Person With Intellectual Disability (2006) 4.  
12 Re Beth [2013] VSC 189; Re Thomas [2009] NSW SC 217. 
13 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (In re F). 
14 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458 (R v 
Bournewood) 
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questions raised above about the scope of necessity and whether it requires a situation of 
imminent peril remain live in that setting.  So too, in jurisdictions where the criminal law is 
governed by the common law, there is room for debate about how far the necessity defence 
does or should extend.   
 
However, in those Australian jurisdictions regulated by a Criminal Code or where necessity 
has been recognised in statute, the defence has been couched in terms of imminent peril, 
extraordinary circumstances or other such situations.  Accordingly, the question about the 
scope of the necessity defence does not arise. A related issue that has arisen in these 
jurisdictions though is whether an action can be justified as ‘necessary’ if the person 
(defendant) has a ‘duty’ to act in a way that would otherwise be unlawful.  In at least one 
Australian state with a Criminal Code, a duty to care for an individual was held to trump 
another (conflicting) legal duty, and so authorised an otherwise potentially unlawful course of 
action.15 The reliance on (and acceptance by the court of) a more compelling duty could be 
regarded as engaging a quasi-necessity defence (when necessity is construed in a broader 
non-urgent sense) in that a requirement or need to act in a particular way excuses otherwise 
criminal behaviour. This ‘conflict of duty’ approach to necessity will be considered in this 
article as well. 
 
This article begins by outlining the importance of personal liberty and bodily security, not 
only as critical human rights but also fundamental common law principles. These principles 
find expression in the various protections of both criminal and civil law against the use of 
unlawful detention and restraint. Then a range of excuses and defences are examined that 
may provide lawful authorisation for detention and restraint in very limited circumstances.  
The article then turns to its main focus: the defence of necessity, and examines the distinction 
between necessity as an excuse and necessity as a justification.  We identify a series of 
concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity 
and safeguards. We conclude by urging Australia to reject the United Kingdom approach and 
to retain an excuse-based defence, arguing that the risks of permitting the essentially 
utilitarian model of justification are too great. 
 
                                            
15 See Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454. 
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II. LIBERTY, SECURITY AND THE UNLAWFULNESS OF DETENTION AND 
RESTRAINT WITHOUT AUTHORISATION 
 
 
Regardless of good intentions, restricting a person’s free exit from disability services and 
other health facilities or the use of physical restraint affects two important human rights and 
common law principles – liberty and security.  
 
As human rights, liberty and security are expressed as civil and political rights, and are 
enunciated in article three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)16as the 
right to ‘life, liberty and security’ and article nine of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), that recognises that ‘everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of the person.’17  
 
The protection of liberty as a human right, is not confined to imprisonment or police custody, 
but includes a wide range of circumstances in which a person may be deprived of their liberty 
including for example by involuntary hospitalisation.18 This right prohibits arbitrary arrest 
and detention and deprivation of liberty other than in accordance with procedures established 
by law.19 As a human right, the right to security of the person refers to ‘freedom from bodily 
injury, including fatal injury.’20 The right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and punishment in article seven of the ICCPR also overlaps with the 
right to liberty and security.21 
 
                                            
16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GARES217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183 plen mtg, 
UN Doc A/ 810 (10 December 1948). 
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
18 Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 
No.35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of the Person (107th session, Geneva, 11-28 March 2013) 3.  
19 Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 
No.35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of the Person (107th session, Geneva, 11-28 March 2013) 4.  
20 Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 
No.35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of the Person (107th session, Geneva, 11-28 March 2013)  2.  
21 Human Rights Committee, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 
No.35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of the Person (107th session, Geneva, 11-28 March 2013)  2.  
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Liberty and security are also important common law principles. Personal liberty has been 
described as the most basic freedom22 and one of the most fundamental of all rights.23 The 
contravention of this right was recognised by Blackstone as one of the most serious: 
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: 
for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison 
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper…there would soon be 
an end of all other rights and immunities.24 
 
In Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yeats, Isaacs J acknowledged that although this 
principle cannot be found in any ‘written constitution of Australia,’25 the right to personal 
liberty is enshrined in the Magna Carta26 and other ancient Imperial statutes,27 which has been 
recognised as forming part of our ‘constitutional heritage and express fundamental principles 
and values which continue to influence the application and development of the common 
law.’28 Isaacs J summarised the principles recognised by clause 39 of the Magna Carta and 
other justice and liberty provisions as follows:  
 
(1) primarily every free man has an inherent individual right to his life, liberty, 
property and citizenship;  
(2) his individual rights must always yield to the necessities of the general will 
of the State; 
(3) the law of the land is the only mode by which the State can so declare its 
will.29 
 
Effectively this means that the underlying principle in our common law is that no one can be 
deprived of his or her liberty except in accordance with the procedures established by law.  
                                            
22 Lexis Nexis, Halsburys Laws of Australia (7 October 2011) 3 Liberty and Security of Persons, 
Introduction [80-100];  South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 423 (Crennan and Bell JJ) citing 
Al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 (per Gleeson CJ). 
23 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70, [86] 
(Black CJ, Sundberg and Winberg JJ) quoting Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v 
VFAD of 2002 (2003) 196 ALR 111 [108]-[112]. 
24 Wayne Morrison (ed), Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (Cavendish, Volume 1, 
2001) 101. 
25 Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 74, 79 (Isaacs J). 
26 Magna Carta 1297 (Imp) cl 39. 
27 Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355, [25] – [28] (Bell J). Bell J identified these statutes as in 
force here to specified extent. These include for example the Magna Carta 1297 (25 Edward 1, cl39); 
Bill of Rights 1688 (1 William and Mary, ss11, cl11); Petition of Right 1627 (3 Charles 1, cl10); and 
various Habeas Corpus Acts which are in force in Australian states and territories by virtue of various 
application acts and reception acts.  
28 Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355, [25] (Bell J). 
29 Ex parte Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 74, 79 (Isaacs J). 
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The common law principle of bodily security, or that ‘every person’s body is inviolate,’30 is 
similarly sacrosanct. The right to bodily security is based on the underlying principles of self-
determination and autonomy that developed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, and were to lay the foundation for the modern tort of trespass, including the need 
for consent to medical treatment and the right to refuse treatment as expressed by Robins JA 
in Malette v Shulman:  
 
The right to determine what shall be done with one's own body is a 
fundamental right in our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the 
bedrock upon which the principles of self-determination and individual 
autonomy are based. Free individual choice in matters affecting this right 
should, in my opinion, be accorded very high priority.31 
 
Consistent with these important principles described above, the common law has developed 
remedies for the contravention of personal liberty and security and there are equivalent 
criminal law offences that punish the use of detention and restraint unless authorised by law.  
The right to liberty as contained in the common law is secured by the imposition of limits by 
the courts on the exercise of powers of arrest, detention and deprivation of liberty unless 
authorised by law.32 These interests are manifested in the writ of habeas corpus,33 the tort of 
false imprisonment34 and criminal law prohibitions on deprivation of liberty.35  
 
Invasions of bodily security or integrity represented by physical or mechanical restraint of a 
person are, at civil law, protected by the tort of trespass, in particular battery,36 while the use 
of physical restraint may amount to an assault at criminal law.37 
                                            
30 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177 (Goff LJ). 
31Malette v Shulman [1990] 67 DLR (4th) 321, 336 (Robins JA). 
32 Lexis Nexis, Halsburys Laws of Australia (7 October 2011) 3 Liberty and Security of Persons, 
Introduction [80-100]. 
33 Antunovic v Dawson (2010) 30 VR 355. 
34 Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 426. 
35 See for example Criminal Code (Qld) s 355; Criminal Code (WA) s 333; Criminal Code (NT) s 
196; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31. 
36 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172. 
37 See for example Criminal Code (Qld) s 335; Criminal Code (WA) s 333; Criminal Code (NT) s 
188; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas); 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20. 
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III DEFENCES: SELF-DEFENCE, MEDICAL EMERGENCY AND NECESSITY  
 
 
Consistent with the significance of these important common law principles and their 
protection in both the civil and criminal law, the circumstances in which this interference will 
be tolerated are generally tightly restricted.  Interference with liberty and security will only be 
permitted where it is justified, authorised or excused by law. Broadly, defences such as self-
defence, medical emergency and necessity (as it is usually applied) will only provide for the 
lawfulness of detention or restraint in very limited circumstances. 
 
Self-defence, a potential defence in the criminal law38 as well as in relation to intentional 
torts such as battery and false imprisonment,39 provides a defence where a person acts in 
response to an actual or threatened attack, out of a reasonable fear for his or her life or safety 
of his or her person, with the degree of force reasonably believed to be necessary.40 Therefore 
if a support worker or health professional was in immediate danger of being harmed or was 
under attack, it would potentially be a defence to battery, for example, to physically restrain 
the person or to use other physical actions in their own defence. After the immediate danger 
is passed however and the support worker or health professional’s safety is assured, further 
acts of restraint or confinement would not be covered by the defence.41  
 
Similarly under the common law defence of ‘medical emergency’ it is also lawful, to provide 
medical treatment without consent where it is necessary to save a person’s life or prevent 
serious harm, where consent is unable to be obtained because for example the patient is 
unconscious. 42   This defence has been enacted into statute in some jurisdictions.43  This 
                                            
38 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 10(4); Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 42; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
ss 418-423; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 29; Criminal Code (Qld) ss 271-273; Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15; Criminal Code (TAS) s 46; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 
1913 (WA) s 248; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 322K-322M.  
39 Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177. 
40 Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 661 (Wilson, Dawson, 
Toohey JJ); R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 at 460 (Dixon CJ). 
41 McClelland v Symons [1951] VLR 157. 
42 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 72 (Lord Goff); Hunter and New England 
Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J); Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 
CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey JJ). 
43 Ben White, Lindy Willmott and Shih-Ning Then, ‘Adults who lack capacity: Substitute decision-
making’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia (2nd ed, 
Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2014) 193-253, [7.180]. 
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principle has also been described as ‘necessity’,44 but necessity also applies more broadly 
than medical treatment scenarios. 
 
Necessity, a defence long recognised both in criminal law45 and tort law,46 has been described 
as a rather ‘elusive doctrine’.47 Commentators have noted a reluctance to codify the defence 
of necessity48 and courts have found the defence difficult to describe in general terms. As 
Lord Wolf CJ stated, ‘any attempt at a definition of necessity is fraught with difficulty 
because its development has been closely related to the particular facts of the different 
cases.’49  
 
The defence, or at least a species of the defence, is sometimes described as ‘duress of 
circumstances,’50as expressed by Simon  Brown J in R v Martin:  
 
English law does, in extreme circumstances recognise a defence of necessity. 
Most commonly this defence arises as a duress, that is, pressure on the 
accused’s will from the wrongful threats of violence of another. Equally 
however it can arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or 
others. Arising thus it is conveniently called ‘duress of circumstances’.51 
 
As illustrated by Simon Brown J, there is a history of the two terms (duress and necessity) 
being used interchangeably, with courts recognising the two defences sharing similar 
principles.52 Necessity is sometimes distinguished from duress, with duress describing human 
                                            
44 Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J) 
45 Reniger v Fogossa (1552) 1 Plowd 1. 
46 Mouse’s Case (1609) 77 ER 1341. 
47 Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 676 (Dickson J). 
48 Michael Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying necessity: legislative resistance to enacting the choice of evils 
defenses to criminal liability’ (2007) (82) 19 Tulane Law Review 191. Hoffheimer describes the 
failed attempts at the codification of a general defence of necessity based on the Model Penal Code in 
the United States. See In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147 
where Brooke LJ describes the failed attempts at codification of a general defence in the United 
Kingdom since the early nineteenth century (at 222-3) and the Law Commission between 1974 and 
1993 (at 225-8).  
49 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2223 (Lord Wolf CJ). 
50 R v Conway [1989] 1 QB 290; Police v Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117.  
51 R v Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652 [653-654] (Simon Brown J ). 
52 Taipa v the Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95 [36]. 
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pressure or threats (that is ‘duress by threats’) and necessity describing non-human threats or 
pressure (that is ‘duress of circumstances’).53  
 
Nevertheless necessity is recognised as part of the English common law,54 and has been 
recognised by Australian courts.55 Most descriptions of the defence describe three broad 
elements that must be satisfied. First the act must be done to avoid an irreparable evil (such 
as imminent peril to life or of serious injury) to the person or another for whom the defendant 
is or reasonably regards himself or herself as responsible.56  Second, the defendant must be 
acting from a reasonable belief that he or she was placed in a situation of imminent peril 57  
and if so, acted in a manner consistent with how a reasonable person would have responded.58 
Finally, the act done must be proportionate to the ‘evil’ or harm about to be inflicted.59 
 
In summary, these common law defences, including necessity as it has been generally 
understood, may provide protection from criminal and/or civil liability for the very short-term 
use of detention and restraint in situations akin to emergencies. They will not however 
provide protection for longer-term restraint and detention of people in residential disability 
services, hospitals, health facilities and aged care facilities.  
 
The concept of necessity as a justification is a relatively new development in the English 
common law in a range of what are called ‘medical cases’.60 Necessity as justification has 
arisen in response to the challenges faced when neither statutory authorisation or the 
traditional defences or excuses apply. As a justification, rather than as an excuse, there is no 
requirement for an emergency or the risk of imminent harm.  
                                            
53 Michael Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying necessity: legislative resistance to enacting the choice of evils 
defenses to criminal liability’ (2007) (82) 19 Tulane Law Review 191, 205; R v Howe [1987] AC 417, 
419. 
54 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206; In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; In Re A 
(Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
55 R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.  
56 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 670 (Menhennit J); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 (Young CJ, 
King J); R v Abdul v Hussein [1999] Crim LR 57 (Rose LJ). 
57 Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734, 746 (Davies LJ); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 
(Young CJ, King J). 
58 R v Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, 653-4 (Simon Brown J). 
59 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ); R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, 448 (Young 
CJ and King J). 
60 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2226 (Lord Wolf CJ). 
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IV NECESSITY AS A JUSTIFICATION  
A. The distinction between necessity as an excuse and a justification 
The defence of necessity as broadly recognised in the common law (outlined in the previous 
section), and which is the form most often codified in several jurisdictions, is not usually 
recognised as a general defence. It generally comes with restrictions such as the need for the 
person seeking exculpation to be faced with circumstances of imminent harm or peril.61 In 
this sense it aligns with what would ordinarily be understood as an excuse, rather than a 
justification.  
 
A distinction is made in criminal law between an excuse and a justificatory defence.62 In the 
context of an excuse, the action is recognised as wrongful even in the special circumstances 
of the case, but is nonetheless excused. An example of an excuse in criminal law is insanity: 
criminal responsibility is not imposed on an individual due to his or her mental state but this 
is not a finding that what he or she did was not wrong. By contrast, in the context of a 
justification, the action is not wrongful, but recognised as permissible or even desirable.63 An 
example of justification is self-defence; the need to defend oneself means the act is an 
appropriate response to violence or other threat and is no longer wrongful.  
 
A distinction between necessity as an excuse and a justification was recognised in the leading 
Canadian case of Perka v the Queen.64 As explained by Dickson J, when expressed as an 
excuse the action is still considered wrongful but ‘the circumstances under which it was done 
are such are that it ought not to be attributed to the actor.’65 While in literal terms it is 
understood that the actor voluntarily performed the act, the action is conceptualised as 
involuntary in the sense of ‘moral’ or ‘normative’ involuntariness.66  It is involuntary in the 
sense that it was performed in an urgent situation of ‘clear and imminent peril where 
                                            
61 Hoffheimer notes that the majority of states in the United States have refused to codify a general 
form of the defence and that 17 out of 19 states that do codify it impose additional requirements such 
as imminent harm: Michael Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying necessity: legislative resistance to enacting the 
choice of evils defenses to criminal liability’ (2007) 82 Tulane Law Review 191. 
62 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 789; Perka v the Queen 
[1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J); George P Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing 
Conditions’ (1973-4) 47 Southern California Law Review 1269.  
63 George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 789; Perka v the Queen 
[1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J); Itzhak Kugler, ‘Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)’ 
(2004) 68 (5) Journal of Criminal Law 440, 442. 
64 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232. 
65 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 246 (Dickson J). 
66 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 249 (Dickson J). 
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compliance with the law is demonstrably impossible.’67 Dickson J explains the rationale 
behind the defence of necessity as an excuse: 
 
At the heart of the defence is the perceived injustice of punishing violations of the 
law in circumstances in which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice 
available; the act was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically 
unavoidable.68 
 
Such a defence has been recognised from the earliest times with Aristotle in Nicomachean 
Ethics describing the jettisoning of cargo from a ship by a man to save himself and his crew 
stating that ‘any sensible man does so.’69  A defence of necessity was recognised by Bacon in 
the common law in his 1630 text The Elements of the Common Lawes of England. Bacon’s 
Rule 5 ‘Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad iura privata’ (‘necessity introduces a privilege 
with respect to private rights’)70 was explained by Bacon as such: 
The law chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsory, and not 
voluntary, and where there is not a consent and election; and therefore if either 
there be an impossibility for a man to do otherwise, or so great a perturbation of 
the judgment and reason as in presumption of law man’s nature cannot 
overcome, such necessity carrieth a privilege in itself. 71 
 
Similarly Hobbes in Leviathan expressed that: 
If a man, by the terrour of present death, be compelled to do a fact against the 
law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own 
preservation.72 
                                            
67 Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616, 678 (Dickson J). 
68 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 250 (Dickson J). 
69 D Ross (tr), Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book III (1975) 49 (quoted in Perka v the Queen 
[1984] 2 SCR 232, 241 (Dickson J)). 
70 Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon’s The Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630) (Garland 
Publishing, New York 1978) (quoted in Michael H Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying Necessity: Legislative 
Resistance to Enacting the Choice of Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability’ (2007) 82 Tulane Law 
Review 191, 201). 
71 Francis Bacon, Francis Bacon’s The Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630) (Garland 
Publishing, New York 1978) (quoted in Michael H Hoffheimer, ‘Codifying Necessity: Legislative 
Resistance to Enacting the Choice of Evils Defenses to Criminal Liability’ (2007) 82 Tulane Law 
Review 191, 201). 
72 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Pt II (1651) (Pelican, 1968) 157 (quoted in Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 
SCR 232, 241 (Dickson J)). 
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The wrongfulness of the action continues to be recognised, but it is excused on the grounds of 
an understanding of and compassion with the force of circumstances under which the actor 
was placed.73 
 
In Perka Dickson J was careful to restrict the defence (that he argued must be ‘strictly 
controlled’ and ‘scrupulously limited’) to situations that correspond to its underlying 
rationale.74 That is, as an excuse, necessity must be restricted to situations of imminent peril 
‘where compliance with the law is demonstrably impossible’75 and where ‘normal human 
instincts cry out for action and make a counsel of patience unreasonable.’76 
 
Unlike an excuse, where the action is still acknowledged as morally and socially forbidden 
(but excused in the circumstances), necessity as a justification recognises the action in 
question as permissible, even desirable.77 Further, the action in question involves a rational 
and reasoned choice. Blackstone described this species of necessity under the heading of 
‘Choice Between Two Evils’.78 The underlying rationale, as described by Fletcher, for the 
defence as a justification is the rightness of the act, and the degree to which it maximises 
overall utility:  
When necessity figures as a justificatory rationale, the issue is whether, on 
balance, the act is right or wrong. The rightness of the act typically turns on a 
comparison of the utility of acting (the value of the interest saved) with the 
disutility of acting (the value of the interest sacrificed). Rightness is thus a 
matter of maximizing utility or furthering the greater good.79 
 
In the leading Canadian cases of Perka80 and Morgentaler v the Queen,81 Dickson J, who 
presided in both, expressed the strong view that a defence of necessity was recognised in 
Canada, but only as an excuse.  Whereas in her dissenting judgment in Perka, Wilson J 
                                            
73 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 248 (Dickson J). 
74 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 250 (Dickson J). 
75 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 251 (Dickson J). 
76 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 251 (Dickson J). 
77 Itzhak Kugler, ‘Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)’ (2004) 68 (5) Journal of Criminal 
Law 440, 442. 
78 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 243 (Dickson J). 
79 George P Fletcher, ‘The Individualization of Excusing Conditions’ (1973-4) 47 Southern California 
Law Review 1269, 1274. 
80 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232. 
81 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232; Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616. 
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disagreed with Dickson, instead identifying an alternative jurisprudential basis of the defence 
as a justification, but in limited circumstances. In Wilson J’s view such a justification could 
be premised on conflicting duties, but not as Dickson J said where the duties in question were 
purely ethical duties, or a utilitarian balancing of the benefits of obeying the law as opposed 
to disobeying it, but rather where there is a conflict of legal duties, that is, where the duties in 
question were both recognised by law.82 
 
Both versions of the defence (excuse and justification) also require an element of 
proportionality. In the case of both necessity as an excuse and a justification there cannot be 
‘too much a gap’83 between the harm done and the benefit accrued.84  
 
To that date the English courts too had (with some possible exceptions) 85 overall seemed to 
restrict necessity (or duress of circumstances) to an excuse where imminent peril of death or 
of serious injury was an essential element of the defence.86  
B. The UK and the extension of necessity 
 
In England, there were a string of key cases (primarily medical in nature) that developed the 
doctrine of necessity beyond situations of emergency, as a justification.  Many of these cases, 
including two of the key cases that will be discussed below, concerned the involuntary 
                                            
82 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 274 (Wilson J). 
83 Perka v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232, 252 (Dickson J). 
84 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ). 
85 In R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 McNaughten J arguably imported the concept of necessity as a 
general defence when at the time that there was no defence of a therapeutic abortion.  McNaughten J 
found the word ‘unlawfully’ with respect to the offence of unlawfully procuring a miscarriage, 
imported provisions found elsewhere in the Act. The Infant (Preservation) Act 1929 section (1)(1) 
also provided that no person would be guilty of an offence if they acted in good faith and for the 
purpose of preserving the life of the mother. While Brooke LJ puts forward this as an example of the 
utilisation of the broad general defence in In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) 
[2001] Fam 147 (at 231), in Morgentaler v the Queen [1976] 1 SCR 616 Dickson J argued (at 678-
680) that the judge had not expressly relied on the defence of necessity and further that he thought this 
doubtful authority for the general defence given the uniqueness of the facts and law in R v Bourne. 
86 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] 1 Ch 734, 746 (were Edmund Davies LJ 
said that as far as his reading goes ‘it appears that all the cases where a plea of necessity has 
succeeded are cases which deal with an urgent situation of imminent peril’); R v Martin (Colin) 
[1989] 1 All ER 652 (where Simon Brown J said  that imminent peril of death or serious injury was 
an essential feature of the defence); R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (where Wolf LJ stated that 
after reviewing the authorities that except for some of the medical cases the way to reconcile the 
authorities was that the defence is available where the defendant commits an otherwise criminal act to 
avoid an imminent peril or danger to life or serious injury).  
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treatment and detention of people with intellectual impairment.87 These cases also coincided 
with the growth of an advisory declaratory jurisdiction in response to a recognised ‘gap’ in 
the law with regards to the treatment of incapacitated adults with no mental illness.88 The 
superior courts in the United Kingdom were called upon to fill this gap until the enactment of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) and did so drawing on the doctrine of necessity.  
 
In re F involved a 36 year old ‘mentally handicapped’ woman who had been a ‘voluntary’ in-
patient at a mental health hospital for approximately 22 years, since the age of 14. F had 
developed a sexual relationship with another patient P. F’s mother, concerned that she may 
become pregnant, with the support of the hospital staff, sought a declaration that sterilisation 
would be lawful. 
 
This case was decided in a particular legal context, one that is unfamiliar in Australia and the 
United States. The House of Lords found that no power of the court to consent to the 
operation on behalf of F existed, nor could the court exercise the parens patriae jurisdiction. 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Donaldson had explained that the last such Royal Warrant under 
the Sign Manual (the instrument by which the Queen delegated her responsibility for welfare 
of her subjects to the courts) had been revoked on 1 November 1960 ‘possibly in the 
mistaken belief the court had all necessary powers under the Mental Health Act 1959’.89 This 
was also accepted by the House of Lords,90 who then found it necessary to then consider the 
lawfulness of the surgery at common law. The ‘startling fact’ was acknowledged that there 
was no English authority on the question of whether, under the common law, medical 
treatment could be provided to a person incapable of providing consent.91 
 
Lord Goff expressed that ‘we are searching for a principle upon which, in limited 
circumstances, recognition may be given to a need, in the interests of the patient, that 
treatment should be given to him in circumstances where he is (temporarily or permanently) 
                                            
87 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1; R v Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458; In re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Family 
Division Reports 338; Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1. 
88 Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Family Division Reports 338 (Butler-Sloss LJ); Re S 
(Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1.  
89 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 12 (Lord Donaldson MR). 
90 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 71 (Lord Goff). 
91 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 71. 
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disabled from consenting to it.’92 Lord Bridge expressed disbelief that people with disability 
could not be treated under the common law and stated that it would be:  
 …intolerable for members of the medical and nursing and other professions 
devoted to the care of the sick that in caring for those lacking the capacity to 
consent to treatment they should be put in the dilemma that, if they administer 
the treatment which they believe to be in the patient’s best interests, acting with 
due skill and care, they run the risk of being held guilty of trespass to the 
person.93  
 
The need was ultimately met by the doctrine of necessity, which the majority found provided 
lawful justification for the treatment of F, as long as the treatment was in F’s best interests.94  
 
To fall within the principle, Lord Goff stipulated, there first there had to be a necessity to act 
when it is not practicable to communicate with the person, and secondly, the action taken 
must that of a reasonable person in all the circumstances who acts in the best interests of the 
person.95 Best interests could be determined by whether the doctor acted ‘in accordance with 
a responsible and competent body of relevant professional opinion,’96 or what is known as the 
‘Bolam Test,’ principles laid down in the leading medical negligence case of Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee.97 
 
The elements of the doctrine as stipulated by Lord Goff broadened the defence significantly, 
arguably providing the basis for the continued utilisation of the defence in a number of 
different factual circumstances.  
 
This indeed turned out to be the case and the doctrine of necessity was again relied upon by 
the House of Lords to justify the detention of a 48 year old man with autism and a learning 
disability in R v Bournewood.98 L had become agitated when he was in attendance at a day 
centre and his carers could not be contacted. He was sedated and taken by ambulance to the 
                                            
92 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 74 (Lord Goff). 
93 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 52 (Lord Bridge). 
94 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 55 (Lord Brandon) 69 (Lord Griffiths) 75 
(Lord Goff). 
95 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 75 (Lord Goff). 
96 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 78 (Lord Goff). 
97 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
98 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458. 
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Bournewood Hospital where he was assessed by a psychiatrist as requiring in-patient 
treatment. He was never formally admitted under the Mental Health Act 1983 (UK) as he was 
thought to be ‘compliant’ and did not resist the admission. His medical staff forbade his 
carers to either visit him or take him home. While not in a locked ward, he was kept under 
constant observation and closely monitored.99 An application was made for judicial review of 
the decision to detain him, a writ of habeas corpus and damages for false imprisonment and 
assault. 
 
Regardless of the disagreement amongst the House of Lords in relation to whether L had in 
fact been detained, 100  it was common ground that L’s admission to hospital or any 
deprivation of liberty that occurred in the process was justified on the basis of the common 
law doctrine of necessity.101  
 
Lord Goff, who delivered the principal judgment, opined that the treatment of L as an 
informal patient, including any treatment that ‘might otherwise have constituted an invasion 
of his civil rights’ was justified on the basis of ‘the common law doctrine of necessity.’102 He 
stipulated that this was both for any restrictions on his freedoms, but also any ‘touching’ that 
occurred.103 
 
Following In re F, until the enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) (when 
parliament finally filled the ‘gap’ for treatment and other decisions made on behalf of 
incapacitated adults),104 ostensibly it was the common law doctrine of necessity that provided 
lawful authorisation not only for treatment but also the day to day care and living 
                                            
99 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 495 (Lord 
Steyn). 
100R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458. 486  
(Lord Goff found that L had not been detained) 490 (Lord Lloyd concurred with Lord Goff) 492 
(Lord Nolan found that L had been detained) 495 ( Lord Steyn found that L had been detained). 
101 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 488 
(Lord Goff) 490 (Lord Lloyd) 492 (Lord Nolan) 497 (Lord Steyn).. Ultimately in HL v United 
Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 761 the European Court of Human Rights did find L’s right to liberty had 
been violated and that neither access to judicial review or the common law doctrine of necessity 
provided sufficient procedural safeguards in accordance with article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
102 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 488 
(Lord Goff). 
103 R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, 489 
(Lord Goff). 
104 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) came into force in 2007. 
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arrangements for adults without capacity.105 Using their inherent declaratory jurisdiction, the 
courts helped to fill the legislative gap (described above) made by the enactment of the 
Mental Health Act 1959 and the revocation of the Royal Warrant (which provided for the 
court’s parens patriae jurisdiction) on the same day the act came into force.106 In In Re F 
(Adult Court’s Jurisdiction),107 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss noted that since In re F (a 
decade earlier) the courts had defined various areas in which the doctrine of necessity, by 
way of declarations, could meet the gap in the law, acknowledging that as the ‘law has so far 
not been amended’ and that ‘the High Court continues to be asked to make and does make 
declarations in appropriate cases.’108 Utilising the declaratory jurisdiction, on many occasions 
the courts ruled on the lawfulness or otherwise of the proposed treatment or care of 
incapacitated adults, depending on whether the treatment was in the patient’s best interests.109 
 
Later in Re A (Children),110 the doctrine of necessity was once again relied upon, this time to 
justify the lawful separation of two conjoined twins, Mary and Jodie. The medical evidence 
was that surgery to separate the twins would result in the death of one of the children within 
minutes, but that failure to operate would result in the death of both twins within 3 to 6 
months. 111  The parents, devout Roman Catholics, were opposed to the surgery. The hospital 
sought a declaration that carrying out the separation surgery would be lawful. The majority of 
the Court of Appeal found the surgery would be lawful on the basis of necessity. 112 
Interestingly, all three Lords Justices preferred the dissenting judgment of Wilson J discussed 
                                            
105 The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) also commenced in 2009. They provided for 
administrative procedures to be followed in the case of incapacitated adults not covered by the Mental 
Health Act who were deprived of their liberties in care homes or hospitals. They were introduced 
following the finding in HL v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 761 that there was a lack of 
appropriate procedures to safeguard against arbitrary detention.  
106 In Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 54 (Butler-Sloss P). 
107 In Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38. 
108 In Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 44 (Butler-Sloss P). 
109 See for example In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 106; S (Hospital Patient: 
Court’s Jurisdiction) (No 1) [1995] 3 WLR 78; C (Mental Patient: Contact) [1993] 1 FLR 940; W 
(An Adult: Mental Patient) (Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381. 
110 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. 
111 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147.  
112 Lords Justices Brooke and Walker were most explicit in their recognition of the common law 
defence of necessity as providing justification for the surgery, (Brooke LJ at 236 and Walker LJ at 
255) with Ward LJ focusing on the conflict of duties faced by the doctors and the importance of the 
law enabling them to choose the ‘lesser of two evils’ (at 203). In this case the exceptional nature of 
the case was emphasised, and wider application of the findings discouraged.  
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above in Perka, and identified a conflict of legal duties as an alternative jurisprudential basis 
of the defence as a justification.113 
 
In the three key cases discussed above as well as the ‘declaratory jurisdiction’ cases, the 
courts broke with the previous close connection needed between necessity and duress of 
circumstances. The elements of the extended defence were expressed by Brooke LJ in In Re 
A (Children) as: ‘(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; (ii) no more 
should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved; (iii) the evil 
inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.’114 Reflecting on the relevance of 
the requirement of imminent peril, Brooke LJ cited Goff LJ in In re F that: ‘[t]he principle is 
one of necessity, not emergency.’115  These cases are, however, in stark contrast to the 
general approach at the time to necessity (and which by and large persists in non-medical 
cases).  After reviewing the relevant authorities, Lord Wolf CJ in R v Shayler summarised the 
position as follows:   
So in our judgment the way to reconcile the authorities to which we have 
referred is to regard the defence as being available when a defendant commits an 
otherwise criminal act to avoid an imminent peril or danger to life or serious 
injury to himself or towards somebody for whom he reasonably regards himself 
as being responsible…. 
 
The next requirement is proportionality. This has two elements. The act done 
should be no more than is reasonably necessary to avoid the harm feared and the 
harm resulting from the act should not be disproportionate to the harm 
avoided.116 
C. Necessity in Australian common law: an excuse 
 
                                            
113 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 202 (Ward LJ);  236 
(Brooke LJ); 254 (Walker LJ). 
114 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 240 (Brooke LJ) 
115 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 239 (Brooke LJ). In 
In Re F Lord Goff had stated that the relevance of emergency was that it may give rise to a necessity 
to act in the interests of the assisted person without first obtaining their consent, but emphasised that it 
was not the criterion or pre-requisite (In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 75 (Lord 
Goff)). 
116 R v Shayler [2001] 1 WLR 2206, 2228 (Lord Wolf CJ). 
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In Australia, as McSherry has noted, the doctrine of necessity is less well developed ‘partly 
because circumstances giving rise to it are few and far between.’117 Nevertheless the defence, 
as an excuse, has been recognised, particularly in the criminal law jurisdiction. The common 
law governs the defence in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, while the 
Criminal Codes of Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Western 
Australia all contain the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency.118  Victoria has 
abolished the common law defence of necessity and has a statutory defence of sudden or 
extraordinary emergency.119 Sudden or extraordinary emergency is akin to the more restricted 
form of necessity as an excuse as expressed by Sir Samuel Griffith, the author of the Criminal 
Codes in both Queensland and Western Australia, who explains the effect of relevant 
provision: 
This section gives effect to the principle that no man is expected (for the 
purposes of the Criminal Law, at all events) to be wiser or better than all 
mankind. It is conceived that it is a rule of Common Law, as it undoubtedly is a 
rule upon which any jury would desire to act. It may, perhaps, be said that it 
sums up nearly all the Common Law rules as to excuses for an act which is 
prima facie criminal.120 
 
This is consistent with the common law position so that in R v Loughnan121 Young CJ, 
Crockett and King JJ, after reviewing English authorities, also recognised that an element of 
‘imminent peril’ was fundamental to the defence.122  
Necessity and temporary detention to safeguard people from immediate harm 
 
There is common law authority in Australia for the temporary detention of people with a 
mental disorder in order to safeguard them and others from immediate harm.123 In this respect 
Australian common law follows English common law authority in a number of cases, going 
                                            
117 Bernadette McSherry, ‘The Doctrine of Necessity and Medical Treatment’ (2002) (10) Journal of 
Law and Medicine 10, 10. 
118 Criminal Code (NT) s 33; Criminal Code (Qld) s 25; Criminal Code (WA) s 25; Criminal  Code 
2002 (ACT) s 41. 
119 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322R. 
120 Queensland Parliamentary Papers (CA 89-1897) (footnote to the relevant section in the Draft 
Griffith Code).  
121 R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443.  
122 R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443. 
123 Nick O’Neil and Carmelle Pesiah, Capacity and the Law (Sydney University Press, 2011) [12.2.2]; 
Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621. 
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back to the eighteenth century, where courts have found that short periods of detention or 
restraint applied to an individual who is a danger to himself or others, are lawful based on 
necessity.124 However, in Australia this power appears to be limited to situations of imminent 
peril and an ‘overriding necessity’125 for the protection of the person and others.  
 
Although the defence was not raised, it was discussed by Walsh J in the Australian case of 
Watson v Marshall.126 This case concerned a Victorian man who was detained by a police 
officer in order to take him to a mental health facility for admission. In this case however 
Walsh J found that even if the defence had have been raised, the evidence ‘falls short of 
establishing that there was a necessity to protect the plaintiff or to protect others that would 
justify at common law the action taken by the defendant.’127 
 
As recently as 2011, the NSW Supreme Court referred to the defence in the following terms: 
In general terms, the common law does not confer upon a private individual or 
an institution the power lawfully to detain, in a situation of necessity, a person 
of unsound mind who is a danger to himself or others. However, there is a 
power to impose a temporary restraint on a person ‘who has run amok and is a 
manifest danger either to himself or to others’ (B v Forsey (1988) SCHL 28 Per 
Lord Keith at 63, Lord Griffiths at 68).128 
 
Therefore it would seem that in Australia, while temporary detention and restraint may be 
justified under the common law defence of necessity (or in the case of the codified 
jurisdictions, under the criminal law defence of extraordinary emergency), extended periods 
of detention and/or restraint would not be permitted. 
Medical treatment and the doctrine of necessity 
 
Specifically in relation to medical treatment cases in Australia, it seems, akin to the 
analogous defence of medical emergency, the defence has also only been recognised in 
relation to the concept of ‘emergency’ medical treatment. In fact the two defences are often 
                                            
124 Rex v Coate (1772) Lofft 73; Symm v Fraser (1863) 3 F&F 859; Scott v Wakem (1862) 176 ER 
147; Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621. 
125 Re Hawke (1923) 40 WN 58 (NSW). 
126 Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621. 
127 Watson v Marshall & Cade (1971) 124 CLR 621, 627 (Walsh J). 
128 Darcy (bht Diane Aldridge) v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 413. 
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referred to interchangeably as expressed by McDougall J in Hunter and New England Area 
Health Service: 
Where it is not practicable for a medical practitioner to obtain consent for 
treatment, and where the patient’s life is in danger, if appropriate treatment is 
not given, then treatment may be administered without consent. This is 
justified by what is sometimes referred to as the ‘emergency principle’ or 
‘principle of necessity’.129  
 
A similar basis for medical treatment was acknowledged by the High Court in both Rogers v 
Whitaker130 and Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion’s 
Case).131  
 
The one notable exception is the Queensland case of Queensland v Nolan132 where, although 
it was heard in a Criminal Code jurisdiction, Chesterman J did come close to utilising the 
defence as it had been applied in the English case of Re A (Children).133 
 
Around nine months after the birth of the conjoined twins the subject of the English case of 
Re A (Children), conjoined twins Alyssa and Bethany Nolan were born in Queensland. The 
medical evidence was that without separation both twins would die whereas with separation 
one twin had a chance of survival. The Queensland Supreme Court was approached to 
determine, in its protective jurisdiction, whether the surgery would be in the best interests of 
the children; and whether performing the operation which would lead to Bethany’s death 
would be unlawful. Ultimately Chesterman J found that the surgery would be both lawful and 
in the children’s best interests.  
 
                                            
129 Hunter and New England Area Health Service (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 [31] (McDougall J). 
130 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, 489 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh 
JJ). 
131 Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 
218. 
132 Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454. 
133 In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147. Also see the analysis 
of Colleen Davis, ‘Separating conjoined twins: A medical and criminal law dilemma’ (2010) 17 
Journal of Law and Medicine 594. 
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With respect to best interests, Chesterman J cited with approval the opinion of Walker LJ in 
Re A (Children) that the proposed surgery could be in the best interests of both, without the 
need to value one life over another.134 
 
On the issue of lawfulness however Chesterman J expressed that he found less assistance 
from Re A (Children).  The doctrine of necessity, he concluded, by which two of the Lords 
Justices justified the lawfulness of the separation, was ‘a creature of the common law and 
finds only limited role in the Code.’135 This doctrine he argues, differs from that known as 
‘duress of circumstances’, where: 
… it is established that the person in question has been compelled to act as he did by 
the pressure of threats or other circumstances of imminent peril to which he was 
subjected. The impact of that pressure on his freedom to choose his cause of action 
excuses him from criminal liability.136  
 
Chesterman J found this concept was reflected in section 25 of the Code,137 but he considered 
it to be different from the defence of necessity. This latter defence his Honour described, by 
contrast, as applying where ‘the person’s mind is not irresistibly overcome by external 
pressures’ (applying reasoning adopted in Re A (Children)).138 
 
Chesterman J did find however that the conflict of duties referred to by Ward LJ139 did arise 
under the Code. While the Criminal Code provides that it is unlawful to kill any person 
unless such killing is authorised or justified or excused by law,140 section 286, he stated, 
could also be read as imposing an obligation on doctors to supply medical treatment and 
surgical care to prevent the child (Alyssa) coming to harm.141 While Chesterman J did not 
explicitly recognise the general defence of necessity as a justification (and nor could he for 
criminal law purposes in a Code jurisdiction), arguably his position comes close to Wilson J’s 
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formulation in Perka of ‘conflict of legal duties’ as the jurisprudential basis of a limited form 
of the defence as a justification.142  
 
In summary, the current Australian position has been to treat necessity as an excuse and not 
recognise an extension of the doctrine as a justification. However, we are cognisant of 
developments in the United Kingdom and also of the gaps noted above in Australian law in 
this area and a potential corresponding pressure to fill them.  We argue that such an extension 
of necessity should be resisted both under the common law and as a modified conflict of 
duties approach in Code jurisdictions.  Our reasons for this position are outlined below. 
 
 
V THE FRAUGHT NATURE OF JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
Five, arguably inter-connected, problems can be identified with the recognition of a general 
defence of necessity. They can be broadly classified as problems of democracy, integrity, 
obedience, objectivity and safeguards.  These five problems raise both conceptual and 
normative questions that go to the heart of the nature of law and the legal system: the relative 
importance of maintaining integrity with common law principles; whether judges should be 
concerned with questions of policy as well as principle; and the extent to which it is the role 
of the judiciary to fill in legislative gaps. While comprehensive engagement with these wider 
questions are beyond the scope of this article, we argue that the approach taken to the defence 
of necessity in the United Kingdom has ramifications for people with intellectual impairment 
and other groups in our community who are vulnerable to the abuse of power for the sake of 
convenience, resource constraints, well-meaning paternalism or simply due to the prejudices 
of the day. In particular, as it will be argued below, the use of necessity as a justification for 
the detention and restraint of people with disability (including the closely analogous conflict 
of legal duties approach as recognised in Queensland v Nolan),143 will result in a serious lack 
of safeguards, and no monitoring or oversight of practices that significantly affect the rights 
of people with intellectual impairment.  
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A. The democracy problem 
In explaining his objection to a general defence of necessity, Dickson J in Perka expressed 
that the Criminal Code had already specified a number of identifiable situations where an 
actor is justified in committing what would otherwise be an offence and added that: 
To go beyond that and hold that ostensibly illegal acts can be validated on the 
basis of their expediency would import an undue subjectivity into the criminal 
law. It would invite the courts to second guess the legislature and to assess the 
relative merits of social policies underlying criminal prohibitions.144  
 
In Dickson J’s view, a finding that an otherwise criminal act is lawful because such an action 
achieves, on balance, a better social outcome, involves the judge introducing their own 
standards of right and wrong, declaring the infraction justified despite the legislature’s 
prohibition. Such a finding would be based on an assessment of the underlying policy 
objectives of both the rule infringed and the action that represented the infringement. In 
Dickson J’s view this is not a role that fits well with the judicial function.145  
 
Gardner has called this ‘the democracy problem.’146 A justification of necessity arguably 
challenges the appropriate and respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature in a liberal 
democracy by allowing the court to respond to essentially policy imperatives. This, argues 
Fletcher (whose writings Gardner acknowledges as exploring the democracy problem in 
depth)147 usurps the role of the legislature and could undermine the democratic decision-
making processes that underpin our system of law and government.148 If concurrence of 
judge, jury and the person ‘second-guess’ the legislature by making their own ‘correct 
assessment of compelling social interests’, Fletcher argues this is awry with a democratic 
system of government, where the legislature is supposed to strike a balance between 
competing social interests.149  
 
Dickson J put it this way in Morgentaler v the Queen:  
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No system of positive law can recognize any principle which would entitle a 
person to violate the law because on his view the law conflicted with some 
higher social value.150 
 
In In re F151 and R v Bournewood,152 the House of Lords found itself facing a lacuna in the 
law. While treatment of incapacitated adults would constitute both the ‘crime of battery and 
the tort of trespass,’ 153  there was no statutory scheme that applied to the treatment of 
incapacitated adults and no parens patriae jurisdiction under which the court could authorise 
such treatment or detention. While the legislature had a scheme for the involuntary treatment 
and detention of people with mental illness, there was not a similar scheme for people with 
intellectual impairments. The answer was found in an extension of the common law principle 
of necessity.  
 
The question arises, whether it is the role of the courts to fill this gap and essentially ‘second 
guess’ the legislature by assuming, when it placed a prohibition on unlawful medical 
treatment and detention, that it was not intended (or should not apply) to those in the 
circumstances of F or L, that is, adults with intellectual impairment for whom such treatment 
or detention would be in their best interests.  Or rather is it the role of judicial decision-
making, as Dworkin argues, to enforce existing rights ‘creatures of both history and morality; 
what an individual is entitled to have in civil society,’154 rather than engage in ‘trade-offs of 
benefits and burdens within a community in order to produce some overall benefit of the 
community as a whole.’155  
 
In Australia we face a not too dissimilar situation. Although the superior courts maintain their 
inherent parens patriae jurisdiction, there are limited statutory frameworks providing for the 
lawful detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment.156  This leaves a 
significant gap in the law that has been acknowledged by various law reform commissions 
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and other commentators.157 We argue that the courts should not fill this gap by an extension 
of the common law defence of necessity, as not only would this arguably involve the 
judiciary fulfilling a role more suited to the legislature, but it also raises issues about what 
happens when policy imperatives override consistency with common law principles such as 
liberty and security. This leads to the second related problem – the integrity problem.158 
B. The integrity problem 
Conceptualising necessity as an excuse rather than a justification arguably better preserves 
the law’s integrity. Excuses, argues Fletcher, do not modify the law, rather ‘they relate to the 
subsidiary question, whether a particular individual can be held accountable for violating a 
rule that remains intact.’159 Necessity as a justification, however involves the generation of a 
new rule of law.160 So when faced with a new factual situation, as in In re F, or R v 
Bournewood, an approach that does not privilege integrity with existing common law 
principles such as personal liberty and security, would allow the court to use their discretion 
and make a new rule. As Fletcher argues ‘it posits a right to cause harm under a defined set of 
circumstances.’161 
 
For people with intellectual impairment, it would mean that in certain circumstances they 
could not rely on the same foundational principles and rights that others have. While this has 
a negative impact on people with intellectual impairment, essentially importing a subjective 
and discriminatory approach into the law, it also undermines the integrity of the common law 
as a body of coherent and principled extension of past decisions.162 The law develops in a 
potentially haphazard and inconsistent fashion. 
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Such an approach is also at odds with the importance placed by the common law on 
principles such as personal liberty and security as outlined at the outset of this paper and, in 
particular, the important role of the judiciary as gatekeepers of these principles which impact 
on individuals’ liberties. 
 
C. The obedience problem 
If the law is not predictable and coherent because, as Brudner expresses ‘courts may dispense 
with law for the greater good,’163 a general defence of necessity leaves people ostensibly to 
choose if compliance with the law is on balance consistent with the overall social good.  This 
gives rise to the third, related problem – the obedience problem. 
 
In Southwark London Borough Council v Williams,164 the House of Lords acknowledged the 
defence of necessity, but only as an excuse available in situations of ‘great and imminent 
danger’ and to preserve life,165 because otherwise, as Lord Denning expressed ‘[n]ecessity 
would open a door which no man could shut.’166  A failure to constrain the law in this way 
gives rise to risks of undermining obedience to the law.  In this case the perceived impetus 
for disobeying the law was great and one with which the court sympathised. Necessity was 
raised as a defence to trespass when the defendants, some homeless families living in squalid 
conditions and some evicted from their homes, with dependent young children and babies in 
their care, in an environment of severe housing shortages in 1970s London, moved into 
empty houses owned by the local council without their authority or permission.  
 
The court emphasised that although ‘we can sympathise with the plight they find themselves 
in’ we can go no further.167  The reason said Lord Denning was: 
…because if hunger were once allowed to be an excuse for stealing, it would 
open a way through which all kinds of disorder and lawlessness would pass. So 
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here. If homelessness were once admitted as a defence to trespass, no one’s 
house could be safe.168 
 
Claims of justification, Fletcher argues, lend themselves to universalisation. 169  Given 
necessity as a justification effectively posits a right to disobey the law under a defined set of 
circumstances, then ‘should the same circumstances rear, actors in the future could rely upon 
the decision, and guide their conduct accordingly’.170 This could mean that the impact of 
courts allowing necessity to justify detention and restraint on people with disability is that 
health professionals and others, given comfort by these decisions, take it into their own hands 
to decide when to apply detention and restraint. Practices such as detention and restraint of 
people with disability are likely to continue behind closed doors, without scrutiny, oversight 
and monitoring on the basis of the individual judgments of health professionals and support 
workers.  
 
D. The objectivity problem 
The fourth related problem is one of criteria: how would a defence of justification operate in 
the context of detaining or restraining a person with a disability? In terms of how a defence of 
necessity could operate as a justification, three quite different approaches have been taken by 
the courts in different contexts: a utilitarian calculus, weighing conflicting duties and an 
assessment of an individual’s best interests.  
A utilitarian approach  
 
At its broadest, the defence of necessity as a justification is underpinned by a utilitarian 
calculation of costs and benefits. On this basis Fletcher points out that the conduct will be 
justified if it maximises overall social utility and furthers the greater good.171 But how is this 
to be determined? 
 
An approach to adjudication based on a utilitarian calculus removes the focus of the law from 
a concern with legal principles that secure individual rights, to one that considers broader 
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social or community goals. The problem with pursuing community goals, Dworkin argues, is 
that community goals are not absolute and the community may pursue different goals at 
different times.172 In fact you do not need to go too far back in history to see the results of 
utilitarian calculus in relation to people with disability.  
 
Buck v Bell,173 a case concerning the constitutional validity of Virginian sterilisation laws for 
people with disability, is illustrative of this point. This case, Cynkar argues, reached the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the early twentieth century, at a time when the 
progressive reform impulse had propelled government into an increasingly influential role in 
the life of the nation.174 The theory of eugenics, that held that physical, mental and even 
moral deficiencies had a genetic basis, was very popular and many social reformers in the 
early part of the century advocated eugenic sterilisation as a panacea for most of the troubles 
created by ‘misfits’ in society.175 By 1931, 28 US states had sterilisation laws,176 and over 
6000 eugenics sterilisations were carried out in California between 1909 and 1929.177 These 
were the social conditions and values that Cynkar notes also coincided with a changing 
jurisprudence, one sceptical about the emphasis on individual rights.178  
 
The case concerned Carrie Buck, a ‘mildly retarded’ woman who was committed to the State 
Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded in Lynchburg, Virginia. Carrie had been adopted at 
the age of four by a Mrs Dobbs who alleged she had become ‘unmanageable and 
promiscuous.’ The board of the Directors of the Colony petitioned for an order to sterilise her 
under Virginia’s laws. Ms Buck’s guardian appealed the order of the board in order to ‘test’ 
the constitutional validity of the laws.  
 
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected Counsel for Ms Buck’s argument that the operation of 
the salpingectomy (the surgical removal of the Fallopian tubes) was illegal in that it violated 
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her constitutional right of bodily integrity and was therefore repugnant to the due process of 
the law of the fourteenth amendment to the American Constitution. This case is notable for 
the statements of Holmes J who was of the view, given the ‘burden’ placed on society for the 
care of people with disability, sterilisation was justified: 
 
The commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many defective 
persons who if now discharged would become a menace but if incapable of 
procreating might be discharged with safety and become self-supporting with 
benefit to themselves and society.179  
 
…… It is better for the world that if instead of waiting to execute degenerative 
offspring for crime or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.180  
 
The beliefs expressed by Holmes J (who has been described as the ‘intellectual forebear’ of 
legal realism) 181  in early twentieth century America, at the height of the popularity of 
eugenics, are now considered abhorrent. But while the policy imperatives may be different, 
the calculations made today that balance rights to liberty and security with other social policy 
imperatives, and their results, are disturbingly similar.  
 
In R v Bournewood, for example, where necessity as a defence was utilised to justify the 
detention of a man with autism in hospital, submissions to the Court emphasised the resource 
impacts of the previous Court of Appeal decision. Following the Court of Appeal decision 
(which had found L had been unlawfully detained) there was a great deal of concern 
expressed by the health authorities, the residential aged care facility industry and the Mental 
Health Commission about the impact of the findings on their current practices of ‘informal 
patients’ with mental disorders and the huge resource impost that would result if they all had 
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to be formally admitted under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983. A significant 
part of Lord Goff’s judgment was devoted to explaining the huge resource impact of the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment. Lord Goff explained that enquiries by the Commission suggest 
that ‘there will be an additional 22,000 detained patients resident on any one day as a 
consequence of the Court of Appeal judgement plus an additional 48,000 admissions per year 
under the Act’ stating that ‘[i] is obvious that there would in the result be a substantial impact 
on the available resources...’.182 
 
A cost benefit analysis of this scenario will no doubt weigh heavily on the side of extending 
the common law doctrine of necessity (and as such no need for procedural safeguards for the 
confinement of people with intellectual impairment equivalent to those for people with 
mental illness that exist under the  Mental Health Act 1983). This is particularly the case 
when an estimate of the cost and resources involved in incorporating a further 70,00 
applications, hearings and involvement of associated legal and medical staff in providing 
expert evidence and representation, is put into the scales.  
 
Yet where does this leave individual rights, and how can they be costed in the equation? As 
expressed by Brudner, utilitarianism, which ultimately involves subordination of an 
individual’s rights to the greater good, undermines the objectivity of the law and ultimately 
proves ‘more than its foundations will bear.’183 
Conflict of duties 
 
Another basis on which the defence of necessity as a justification has been framed, one that is 
narrower than the utilitarian basis, is that of conflict of duties.  That is, where the accused 
commits an act in order to fulfil a legal duty that is in conflict with another legal duty the 
accused is charged with breaching.  
 
As considered earlier, in Perka, Wilson J delivered a minority dissenting judgement. While 
she agreed with the Dickson J statement in Morgentaler v the Queen that ‘no system of 
positive law can recognize any principle which would entitle a person to violate the law 
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because in his view the law conflicted with some higher value,’184 she believed this was 
dependent upon the ‘higher social value’ to which the accused points not being one reflected 
in the legal system in the form of a duty.185 Wilson J believed that necessity as a justification 
could be invoked where an accused’s act constitutes the discharge of a duty recognised by 
law so that the justification is established by showing a conflict of legal duties (as well as 
satisfying the rule of proportionality). 186  
 
As we have seen, this idea of a conflict of legal duties was also central to Ward LJ’s 
grounding of necessity as a justification in Re A (Children) where he emphasised that the 
doctors were under a duty to Mary not to operate because it would kill Mary, but also under a 
duty to Jodie, because not to operate would also kill her.187 Later, in the case of Queensland v 
Nolan, Chesterman J also recognised that a conflict of duties could provide lawful 
justification for the separation of conjoined twins, a procedure that would result in the death 
of one of the children.188  
 
Gardner argues that the problem with Wilson J’s position is that it still ‘remains for the court 
to decide whether or not the right promoted by the infraction takes precedence over the 
interest sacrificed’189 and asks why the legislature’s existing ruling on the hierarchy of rights 
should not be conclusive.190  
 
In the context of the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment, they have 
a right not to be subject to such restraints on their liberties other than in accordance with the 
law. This is reflected in various civil remedies and criminal prohibitions on unlawful 
detention and restraint. The question arises whether such rights should be subordinate to the 
duty of doctors or other health professionals to provide for their care and treatment, and if so, 
on what basis and by whom should the outcome of such a ‘conflict’ be decided. 
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So the objectivity problem remains in the conflict of duties scenario as the court is still faced 
with determining itself a hierarchy of rights or duties from which to choose. Which duty 
should prevail and why? This was the situation confronted by the courts in In Re A (Children) 
and Queensland v Nolan. There was a prohibition on unlawful killing, but the doctors also 
owed a legal duty to both twins, arguably an equal duty, which was expressed by Brooke LJ 
in In Re A (Children) as ‘conflicting rights of apparently equal status.’ 191  In both 
circumstances the courts gave priority to the best interests principle, as an essential element 
of the application of the doctrine of necessity but, as we will see, this principle too has its 
own objectivity problem.  
Best interests 
 
In the three key medical cases discussed above, the courts held that for the defence of 
necessity as a justification to succeed, the relevant action had to be in the best interests of the 
person. 192 
 
As one of the key principles that characterises the exercise of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction,193 the best interests principle has been acknowledged by many, including the 
majority in Department of Health and Community Services v JWB & SMB (Marion’s Case) 
as notoriously imprecise.194 One of the biggest criticisms of the best interests approach has 
also been the way in which it is implemented, with commentators noting the lack of a 
transparent and systematic approach to implementing the standard.195  
 
Writing specifically about the utilisation of the best interests test in In Re F, Kennedy has 
criticised the best interests standard with respect to the authorisation of medical treatment for 
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people with disability.  He argues that its implementation lacked a principled approach 
resulting in a lack of accountability for health professionals and others, ultimately defeating 
the very purpose of involving the law.  
 
…. If the law is to serve any purpose it must be to hold accountable those who 
propose to carry out medical interventions without consent, to require of them 
that they render an account to others. This is not because they are not trusted. 
Rather, it is because what is at stake is sufficiently important for the law to be 
involved and the law’s concern is to examine the reasons and justifications for 
doing that which ordinarily would not be permissible in the absence of specific 
statutory authorisation. The best interests approach, however is not a reasoned 
justification. If any reasoning has taken place it has occurred prior to arriving at 
the conclusion that a particular course of conduct is in a person’s best interests. 
If, as in the case, this prior process of evaluation and analysis, and the factors 
underlying it, go unstated, accountability cannot exist. In effect the law 
abdicates its responsibility. Decisions cannot readily be challenged. Discretion 
becomes virtually unfettered.196 
 
A further criticism of the application of the principle, particularly in relation to people with 
disability, is that historically it has tended to be conflated with medical opinion.197   
 
More recent case law has emphasised that best interests is not only a medical assessment but 
should ‘encompass medical, emotional and all other welfare issues’. 198  Further a new 
development that has emerged in the United Kingdom, associated with what Donnelly and 
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others have called a more ‘sophisticated’ and ‘systematic’ approach to best interests, which 
involves the utilisation of a ‘balance sheet’ approach.199 
 
But while such developments may offer a way forward for the exercise of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction (or its effective equivalent in the UK Court of Protection) and potentially offer a 
more systematic and transparent method for determining best interests, particularly for those 
vulnerable to abuses of power for the sake of convenience and prejudice, it remains 
questionable whether it should be relevant to determining the actual lawfulness of a person’s 
detention or restraint under criminal or civil law.  
 
In many cases, the person’s best interests may in fact be served by having their liberties 
restricted. This, however, is not the point as expressed by Lady Hale in P v Cheshire West 
and Chester Council.200  This judgment dealt with two different cases. One concerned two 
sisters, MIG and MEG, both with learning disabilities. MIG, aged 18 years, lived with a 
foster carer, in a home environment, but under a situation of constant supervision. MEG, 
aged 17 years, lived in a facility for adults with learning disabilities, also under constant 
supervision and control as well as subject to tranquilising medication and occasionally 
physical restraint for her challenging behaviours. The second case concerned P, a 38 year old 
man with Cerebral Palsy and Down’s Syndrome, who lived in a bungalow with three other 
residents. He too was under close supervision and control of at least two staff, and was also 
placed in a full body suit to prevent him from picking at his incontinence pads and putting the 
pieces in his mouth. The key question was whether the living conditions of these adults with 
intellectual impairment constituted a deprivation of their liberty, an issue that was initially 
somewhat confused with whether their living conditions were in their best interests. In 2011 
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the Court of Appeal in both cases had found their living conditions had not amounted to a 
deprivation of liberty, adopting an approach that was called ‘relative normality.’201  
 
In the appeal for both cases, Lady Hale who gave the leading judgment for the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court, disagreed with this approach.  Hale J applied the test for 
deprivation of liberty utilised by the European Court of Human Rights in HL v United 
Kingdom,202 that is whether the person ‘was under continuous supervision and control and 
was not free to leave.’203 Whether the deprivation of liberty was for their own best interests, 
or whether they showed ‘tacit acceptance’ of the arrangements, was considered irrelevant.204 
 
In my view, it is axiomatic that people with disabilities, both mental and 
physical, have the same human rights as the rest of the human race. It may be 
that those rights have sometimes to be limited or restricted because of their 
disabilities, but the starting point should be the same as that for everyone else. 
….as it seems to me, what it means to be deprived of liberty must be the same 
for everyone, whether or not they have mental or physical disabilities. If it 
would be a deprivation of liberty to be obliged to live in a particular place, 
subject to constant monitoring and control, only allowed out with close 
supervision, and unable to move away without permission even if an 
opportunity became available, then it must also be a deprivation of liberty of a 
disabled person. The fact that my living conditions are comfortable, and indeed 
make my life as enjoyable as it could possibly be, should make no difference.  
A gilded cage is still a cage.205 
 
What Lady Hale emphasised was that a finding that the sisters MIG and MEG, or P had been 
subjected to a deprivation of their liberties, did not reflect negatively on the good intentions 
of those who cared for them. Rather, what it meant was that they would be subject to certain 
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safeguards, in this case the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards made under the Mental Health 
Act 2005 (UK).206 Lady Hale stated that: 
 
..it is no criticism of them if the safeguards are required. It is merely a 
recognition that human rights are for everyone, including the most disabled 
members of the community, and that those rights include the same right to 
liberty as everyone else.207 
 
This leads to the next and final problem to be discussed. A reliance on the defence of 
necessity as a justification to provide lawful authorisation for the detention and/or restraint of 
people with intellectual impairment means that they do not have access to a range of 
important safeguards that usually accompanies the detention of other members of the 
community such as those convicted of a criminal offence or people with mental illness 
subject to involuntary treatment.  
E. The safeguards problem 
If people with disability can be detained or subject to restraint on the basis of the justificatory 
defence of necessity, not only is there a consequential lack of procedural safeguards, as 
courts cannot provide an adequate legal framework of monitoring and oversight, but it also 
means that discretion is placed in the hands of health professionals and others as to when and 
on what basis to subject a vulnerable adult to detention and/or restraint.  
 
In R v Bournewood, while Lord Steyn agreed that L’s detention could be justified by 
necessity, he expressed his concern that: 
The common law principle of necessity is a useful concept, but it contains none 
of the safeguards of the Act of 1983. It places effective and unqualified control 
in the hands of the hospital psychiatrists and other health care professionals.208 
 
In this case, ultimately the European Court of Human Rights found that the common law 
doctrine of necessity, as the domestic legal basis for L’s detention, did not meet the criteria 
for a valid detention under Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
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lack of procedural safeguards, the court concluded, failed to avoid the key element of 
‘arbitrariness’ in the deprivation of a person’s liberty. 209 In particular the European Court of 
Human Rights drew attention to the lack of any fixed procedural rules for admission and 
detention and the contrast between ‘this dearth of regulation and the extensive network of 
safeguards applicable to psychiatric committals covered by the 1983 Act.’210 
 
Although Australia lacks the entrenched human rights jurisprudence associated with the 
European Convention on Human Rights,211 returning to the discussion at the beginning of 
this paper, both human rights and the common law recognise that a person should only be 
deprived of their liberty in accordance with the due process of law. The emphasis is on 
protecting people from arbitrary detention, at the whim of those in power, without proper 
procedural safeguards.   
 
Should the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment be justified under 
the common law defence of necessity (or indeed even a modified conflict of duties 
approach),212 there will be a serious lack of procedural safeguards with respect to the 
detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment that currently exists for other 
groups in Australian society subject to deprivations of their liberties. For example each state 
and territory currently have statutory schemes for the involuntary treatment and detention of 
people with mental illness213 and there are already a limited number of schemes for 
involuntary treatment of people with intellectual disability and the use of restrictive 
practices.214 While there are varying degrees of safeguards, they can include for example the 
need for assessment by a professional with relevant expertise; a treatment plan; a decision to 
detain or treat the person being made by someone independent of the service that seeks to 
treat or detain them and/or access to oversight and regular review by a court or tribunal. For 
people vulnerable to abuses of power, these safeguards are crucial. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper began with a description of the importance of both personal liberty and security as 
human rights and common law principles, where the emphasis is both on the fundamental 
nature of the rights involved and the avoidance of arbitrary deprivations or restraints upon 
liberty that are not carried out in accordance with due process of the law. If it is otherwise, 
everyone, including people with intellectual impairment, are vulnerable to abuses of power 
and decisions to restrict their liberties based, at best, on convenience and utility or, at worst, 
on prejudice and discrimination. 
 
The authors have pointed out the pitfalls of either an extension of the defence of necessity as 
a justification in civil law or the criminal law (that is either in common law jurisdictions, or 
the adoption of the closely analogous conflict of duties approach in the Criminal Code 
jurisdictions).  
 
Based either on a utilitarian calculus of greater social net benefit, or the more restricted 
conflict of duties approach, the defence of necessity as a justification imports a subjective and 
discriminatory approach into the law when applied to justify the detention and restraint of 
people with intellectual impairment. It provides judges (and eventually medical professionals 
and others) with the discretion to decide if the usual criminal and civil law prohibitions on 
restraint and detention should apply to certain groups in the community who neither have 
capacity to consent nor the protections of relevant statutory safeguards. This ultimately also 
undermines our democratic system of government, paving the way for other vulnerable 
groups to lose their rights and liberties.  
 
But what about cases such as In Re A (Children) and Queensland v Nolan, where the results 
of a steadfast rejection of necessity as a justification may have meant that two children, not 
one would have died? These are cases clearly unforeseen by the legislature, where no existing 
framework that has taken such cases into consideration exists. In some ways, combined with 
the life and death scenario, it could be said this deals in part with the democracy problem. 
When faced with such a situation of life and death, in circumstances clearly unforeseen by 
the legislature, the use of necessity as a justification may be less deserving of criticism, 
particularly if the court strictly limits its decision to the facts of the case (as the court did in 
Re A (Children)).  
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But the restraint and detention of people with intellectual impairment does not fall into such a 
category. The legislature has in fact considered the issue and has thus far responded 
accordingly (albeit in an ad hoc fashion).  There are statutory frameworks for the use of 
restrictive practices on people with intellectual impairment in four jurisdictions in Australia 
and all states and territories have other statutes dealing with specific issues such as 
emergency treatment. While these are limited in scope, they ultimately reflect the current 
approach by respective state legislatures to the issue. Should necessity as a justification be 
recognised as a defence to detention and restraint, this arguably not only usurps the role of 
the legislature, but creates a new legal rule, one particularly for people with disability, that 
will provide comfort and security to hospitals, health facilities, aged care facilities and 
disability support agencies who will adapt their practices accordingly, and use detention and 
restraint without oversight, safeguards and monitoring.  
 
In the gaps in between these legislative frameworks where people with disability are deprived 
of their liberties or subject to unlawful invasions of their bodily integrity, the courts are relied 
upon to uphold their rights and, in doing so, maintain integrity with important common law 
principles such as liberty and security. In this sense they have a crucial role as gatekeepers of 
everyone’s fundamental liberties, including people with intellectual impairment. This does 
not mean that detention and restraint may not sometimes be imposed for the benefit of people 
with intellectual impairment and that those who impose such restrictions do not have the best 
intentions. Rather this position is based on acknowledgement that regardless of best 
intentions or otherwise, people with disability have the same rights as others. But such an 
outcome can only be achieved by legislative frameworks that guarantee appropriate 
safeguards including oversight and monitoring. 
 
The history of the common law is scattered with examples of where pragmatism and utility 
are prioritised, and judicial approaches have broken with established and long-standing 
principles and common law rights, in order to respond to what Oliver Wendell Holmes called 
the ‘felt necessities’215 of the time whether they be social policy agendas, contemporary 
beliefs and values about people with disability or imperatives of resources and convenience. 
At the heart of the argument in this paper advocating against the use of necessity as a 
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justification for the detention and restraint of people with disability in Australia is the notion 
expressed by Kennedy that ‘when utility and pragmatism collide with human rights it is the 
former which must give way. If it is otherwise, the game is lost.’216 
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